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Offshore tax evasion, international money laundering, and
aggressive international tax planning significantly reduce
government revenues. In particular, for some low-income
countries the amount of capital flight (where elites move and
hide monies offshore in tax havens) exceeds foreign aid.
Governments truggle to enforce their tax laws to constrain these
actions, and they are inhibited by a lack of information
concerning international capital flows. The main international
policy response to these developments has been to promote global
financial transparency through heightened cross-border
exchanges of tax information. The Article examines elements of
optimal cross-border tax information exchange laws and policies
by focusing on three key challenges: information quality,
taxpayer privacy, and enforcement. Relatedly, the Article
discusses how the exchange of automatic "big tax data"
combined with data analytics can help address these challenges.
The recommended laws and policies will improve how countries
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share tax information, which in turn will help inhibit global
financial crimes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Civil war has raged in South Sudan since 2013. Since the
beginning of this war, corrupt elites and war profiteers have illegally
diverted and hidden hundreds of millions of dollars through
anonymous tax haven investments.' At the same time, roughly five
out of ten million citizens remain and subsist in near-starvation
circumstances.2 As long as elites can profit from war and hide the
monies offshore, they may not have incentives to end the conflict.
International tax and finance laws allow for these secret offshore
accounts and hence contribute to international human rights
violations in South Sudan and elsewhere.3
Relatedly, a 2014 report by the United Nations Special
Rapporteur for Extreme Poverty and Human Rights notes that
international tax policy serves as a significant contributor to global
poverty and income inequality.4 In support, analysis of the first major
tax haven data leak shows how elites in low and middle income
countries move and hide money offshore and how special tax
incentives allow firms to greatly reduce their global tax liabilities.5
1. THE SENTRY, WAR CRIMES SHOULDN'T PAY: STOPPING THE LOOTING AND
DESTRUCTION IN SOUTH SUDAN 11 (Sept. 2016) (citing a speech from the President of
South Sudan: "An estimated $4 billion are unaccounted for or, simply put, stolen by
former and current officials as well as corrupt individuals with close ties to government
officials."); see Somini Sengupta, In South Sudan, Mass Killings, Rapes, and the Limits
of U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2017) (discussing how diplomatic efforts failed
to stop the risk of genocide), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/worldlafrica/south-
sudan-united-nations.html [https://perma.cclN4VG-FD9E] (archived Sept. 24, 2017);
Geoffrey York, 'Man-made' famine declared in South Sudan: United Nations, GLOBE
AND MAIL (Feb. 20, 2017) (noting that the United Nations declared South Sudan to be
in the midst of a famine), https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/man-made-
famine-declared-in-south-sudan-united-nations-says/article34088530/?ref-
http://www.theglobeandmail.com& [http://perma.cc/E73P-GD76] (archived Sept. 24,
2017).
2. See THE SENTRY, supra note 1, at 5 (noting roughly five out of ten million
citizens receive food aid to stave off starvation).
3. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has
called South Sudan "one of the most horrendous human rights situations in the world."
Id.
4. Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights (OHCHR), Report of the
Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Ms. Maria Magdalena
Sephlveda Carmona, on taxation and human rights, U.N. Doc. A/69/297, at 3 (2014).
5. The data leak, obtained by the International Consortium for Investigative
Journalists in 2012, included over 2.5 million documents. Gerard Ryle et al., Secret
Files Expose Offshore's Global Impact, INT'L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS
(Apr. 3, 2013) http://www.icij.org/offshore/secret-files-expose-offshores-global-impact
[http://perma.cc/G4J9-9NDZ ] (archived Sept. 24, 2017). The total size of the leaked
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Capital flight from some low income countries exceeds the amount of
inward foreign aid, reducing available resources and leading to
devastating consequences, including starvation, disease, and human
rights violations.6
In addition, multinational firms, which are often based in
wealthier countries, operate and exploit natural resources in
developing countries, at times without paying any significant tax.
This leads to the so-called resource curse where resource-rich
countries in the developing world frequently do not benefit from
economic growth or tax revenues as a result of resource exploitation.7
This outcome is attributable to corruption that occurs within some
developing countries where bribes or gifts are provided by
nonresident multinational firms to local government officials in
exchange for tax concessions.8
The main policy response thus far to all of these challenges is to
encourage countries to exchange tax and financial information so that
home countries can better enforce their tax laws to inhibit undesired
activities. Accordingly, designing optimal exchange of information
(EOI) laws and policies for cross-border tax purposes is one of the
main challenges for contemporary international tax law and policy.9
files obtained by the ICIJ "is more than 160 times larger than the leak of US State
Department documents by WikiLeaks in 2010." Id. For discussion, see Arthur J.
Cockfield, Big Data and Tax Haven Secrecy, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 483, 510-517 (2016)
[hereinafter Big Data] (discussing the ICJ data leak and global financial crimes).
Global financial crimes include offshore tax evasion, international money laundering,
and cross-border terrorist financing. Aggressive international tax avoidance is
technically legal in that it seeks to comply with all laws while reducing global tax
liabilities. Id. at 515.
6. LLOYD LIPSETT ET AL., INT'L BAR ASS'N, TAX ABUSES, POVERTY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: A REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION'S HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTITUTE TASK FORCE ON ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS, POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1-
5 (2013); see John Christensen, Africa's Bane: Tax Havens, Capital Flight and the
Corruption Interface 15-18 (Elcano Royal Inst., Working Paper No. 1/2009, 2009)
(describing how certain African countries, which are vulnerable to capital flight, adopt
haven-like tax policies to compete with tax havens); Lonce Ndikumana & James K.
Boyce, New Estimates of Capital Flight from Sub-Saharan African Countries: Linkages
with External Borrowing and Policy Options 27-30 (Political Econ. Research Inst.,
Working Paper No. 166, 2008) (concluding that a "narrow, relatively wealthy stratum"
of the populations of the countries under study maintained assets in foreign countries
that exceeded the national public debts of their own countries). But see Maya Forstater,
It's not aid in reverse, illicit financial flows are more complicated than that, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2017) (questioning the methodology used to calculate illicit capital
flows), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-
network/2017/jan/18/its-not-aid-in-reverse-illicit-financial-flows-are-more-complicated-
than-that [http://perma.cc/4828-5JEM] (archived Sept. 24, 2017).
7. See Allison Christians, Putting the Reign Back in Sovereign, 40 PEPP. L.
REV. 1373, 1385-1389 (2013) (defining "resource curse" as refering to countries that are
resource rich but economically poor); see also discussion infra Part II.A.2.
8. Christians, supra note 7, at 1385.
9. Indeed, cross-border tax sharing "has emerged in recent years as a-
probably the-central issue in international tax policy discussions." Michael Keen &
Jenny E. Ligthart, Information Sharing and International Taxation: A Primer, 13 INT'L
TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE 81, 81 (2006).
[VOL 50:10911094
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While the roots of EOI go back to the post-World War I environment,
the process began to gather real policy steam with the 1998
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
report on Harmful Tax Competition that threatened to blacklist any
noncooperative tax haven.1 0 In particular, governments now seek to
encourage more and better EOI to inhibit a host of revenue-depleting
activities, including aggressive international tax avoidance, offshore
tax evasion, and international money laundering.1 1
Since the OECD's opening shot in the late 1990s, there has been
a series of ambitious EOI reforms, a somewhat stunning development
in the normally glacially paced world of international tax law (see
Part II.B). Recent reforms include the US unilateral Foreign Account
Tax Compliance Act (FATCA); bilateral tax information exchange
agreements (TIEAs); and multilateral efforts to share bulk cross-
border tax information on an automatic basis called the Common
Reporting Standard (CRS) and Country-by-Country Reporting
(CBCR).
This Article discusses EOI initiatives with an eye toward
optimal law and policy. By providing a transaction cost perspective, it
shows how governments can reduce taxpayer and government costs
by focusing on (a) the exchange of high quality tax and non-tax data;
(b) the provision of training and resources to low and middle income
countries to facilitate international tax administration; (c) the
application of data analytics to exchanged and domestic sources of tax
and non-tax information; and (d) the development of taxpayer privacy
safeguards.
The Article is organized as follows: Part II provides context by
reviewing how taxpayers and tax authorities have mixed views on the
need for global financial transparency, and how the recent and varied
EOI reforms reflect this state of affairs. Part III reviews the central
policy challenges involved in efficient and fair EOI: (a) the need to
transfer high quality information (that is, information that is
available, useful, and verifiable for tax authorities); (b) how to protect
taxpayer privacy interests, which vary from country to country; and
(c) how to ensure meaningful enforcement of EOI by countries that
have strong financial secrecy laws and/or lack tax administration
resources. Part IV discusses how the application of data analytics to
transferred tax and non-tax information can help authorities audit
and investigate offshore tax evasion and aggressive international tax
avoidance. Part V concludes.
10. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998); see infra notes 33-36
and accompanying text.
11. For background policy pressures, see Steven A. Dean, The Incomplete
Global Market for Tax Information, 49 B.C. L. REV. 605 (2008) (advocating selling and
purchasing cross-border tax information to promote efficient exchanges).
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II. TRANSACTION COSTS AND CROSS-BORDER TAx INFORMATION
EXCHANGE REFORMS
This Part provides context first by setting out the main
information and incentive problems facing tax authorities when they
seek information concerning international investment income, and
second by discussing the main US and international law and policy
responses to these problems.
A.' High Transaction Costs and EOI Reforms
This subpart outlines the main transaction cost12 challenges
confronting EOI reforms and calls for legal and policy solutions that
reduce transaction costs facing taxpayers and tax authorities.
Depending on the context, laws and policies (and accompanying
bureaucracies) can either reduce or increase these transaction costs,
promoting or discouraging efficiencies.'3 Unlike the private sector,
there are no competitive markets for most goods and. services
supplied by the public sector. As a result, "high transaction cost
issues gravitate to the polity."1 4 As subsequently discussed, this is
certainly the case with respect to EOI initiatives within the
international tax regime.
1. Taxpayers' Preference for Global Financial Opacity
Under the current international tax regime, governments
generally do not know anything about a resident taxpayer's global
activities beyond taxpayer self-disclosure.'5 Enhanced EOI would
12. Transaction costs are the costs associated with discerning a price on a given
exchange. Coase described how legal rules influence transaction costs as exchanges
involve the exchange of rights to perform certain actions (and not merely the trade in
particular goods and services). R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON.
1, 15-16, 43-44 (1960). While transaction costs are normally discussed in the context of
private sector exchanges, transaction cost economics and transaction cost politics
extend the analysis to the public sphere. Under these approaches, government
institutions (that is, informal and formal rules) along with government institutional
arrangements (that is, organizations) determine the level of transaction costs facing
private sector and government actors, which in turn influences economic activities.
Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics
Perspective, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 306 passim (1999).
13. See AVINASH K. DIXIT, THE MAKING OF ECONOMIC POLICY: A TRANSACTION-
COST POLITICS PERSPECTIVES 58-61 (MIT Press 1996).
14. Douglass C. North, A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics, 2 J. THEORETICAL
POL. 355, 362 (1990).
15. For discussion of the difficulties associated with piercing tax haven secrecy,
see U.S. S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND
GOV'T AFFAIRS, MINORITY & MAJORITY STAFF REP., TAX HAVEN ABUSES: THE
ENABLERS, THE TOOLS AND SECRECY 1 (2006) (reviewing evidence that Americans
illegally evade between $40 and $70 billion in US taxes each year).
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seek to change this state of affairs by providing governments with
more and better sources of tax information about their resident
taxpayer's global activities. Taxpayers engaged in offshore tax
evasion and international money laundering clearly prefer the status
quo, which makes it difficult or impossible for authorities to
investigate and track their criminal activities.
Less obviously, many taxpayers engaged in legitimate cross-
border economic transactions and investments also prefer the current
regime with its high transaction costs and lack of global financial
transparency.
Information asymmetries raise transaction costs facing
taxpayers engaged in cross-border transactions and investments.16 A
taxpayer does not know what sort of assessment will take place after
a tax return is filed. In particular, multinational firms pay a hedge
price to guard against risks that they will be overtaxed by domestic
and foreign tax authorities on their sources of cross-border income
(including the risk that a public revelation of any tax plan may harm
the firm's reputation and reduce the value of intangible assets like
brand or goodwill).i 7
All of this hedging takes place in an environment of highly
complex technical rules, making it difficult for taxpayers to predict
how domestic tax laws and tax treaties will mesh with foreign tax
laws. In particular, many governments now deploy increasingly
technical rules-Specific Anti-Avoidance Rules (SAARs), General
Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAARs), judicially promoted anti-avoidance
rules, and so on-to thwart aggressive tax avoidance strategies. This
technical complexity contributes to high taxpayer transaction costs
due to resources deployed to assess how the rules interact as well as
how they will be enforced. Many taxpayers with the resources to
engage in cross-border tax planning are actually financially better off
under this regime as long as their transaction costs are outweighed
by global tax savings.iS
Moreover, under the current approach taxpayers have an
informational advantage over tax authorities as the latter "ex ante
lacks information about the true facts and circumstances on the
16. For discussion, see Arthur J. Cockfield, The Limits of the International Tax
Regime as a Commitment Projector, 33 VA. TAX REV. 59, 72-80 (2013) [hereinafter
Commitment Projector] (describing the international tax regime as a legal and political
system that enables credible government commitments to actors such as taxpayers in
order to reduce transaction costs).
17. See Arthur J. Cockfield & Carl MacArthur, Country-by-Country Reporting
and Commercial Confidentiality, 63 CAN. TAX J. 627, 644-45 (2015).
18. See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 257-64
(2010) (discussing how transaction costs affect tax planning incentives).
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taxable case, whereas the taxpayer has strong incentives not to
disclose all available information .... "
As revealed by accounting works in this area, taxpayers involved
in legitimate businesses at times prefer less financial transparency
when it comes to the disclosure of tax and financial information
concerning their international activities.20 First, enhanced EOI may
trigger a higher risk of audit, forcing the taxpayer to deploy resources
to guard against this risk.21 Second, taxpayers may desire to hide
"sensitive" forms of financial information that could be discerned
through EOI reforms (e.g., reporting on taxes paid in every country
where a firm operates could reveal profit margins for a global supply
chain).22
Third, taxpayers may wish to guard against the risk that trade
secrets or commercially confidential information will be improperly
revealed by governments to foreign competitors, harming their ability
to compete.23 Finally, managers may prefer less transparency to hide
their suboptimal allocation of global resources from , their own
shareholders: greater global financial transparency would let
analysts discover and reveal this poor performance.24
2. Tax Authorities and Mixed Incentives
While taxpayers generally prefer less global financial
transparency, governments have mixed incentives regarding EOI
initiatives. These governments are confronted with different and at-
times conflicting political incentives as they pursue distinct national
socioeconomic agendas through their tax systems.
On the one hand, governments want a fair and efficient tax
system to promote compliance and revenue collection. More and
19. Markus Brem & Thomas Tucha, Globalization, Multinationals, and Tax
Base Allocation: Advance Pricing Agreements as Shifts in International Taxation?, in
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION HANDBOOK: POLICY, PRACTICE, STANDARDS, AND
REGULATION 129 (Colin Read & Greg N. Gregoriou eds., 2007).
20. We reviewed empirical studies within the accounting field that show mixed
results concerning the relationship between reporting geographic earnings and
protecting commercial secrets: some studies conclude that geographic earnings
disclosures harm the competitiveness of firms, while others suggest that such
disclosures do not promote these harmful outcomes. Cockfield & MacArthur, supra
note 17, at 647-50.
21. See the discussion in Ole-Kristian Hope, Mark Ma & Wayne B. Thomas,
Tax Avoidance and Geographic Earnings Disclosure, 56 J. ACCT. & ECON. 170, 185
(2013).
22. See Christine A. Botosan & Mary S. Harris, Motivations for a Change in
Disclosure Frequency and Its Consequences: An Examination of Voluntary Quarterly
Segment Disclosures, 38 J. OF AcCT. RES. 329, 334 (2000).
23. See P.G. Berger & R. Hahn, Segment Profitability and the Proprietary and
Agency Costs of Disclosure, 82 AcCT. REv. 869, 870-71 (2007).
24. Mary Stanford Harris, The Association between Competition and Managers'
Business Segment Reporting Decisions, 36 J. OFACCT. RES. 111, 126 (1998).
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better cross-border tax information will allow governments to pursue
criminal investigations into offshore tax evasion and international
money laundering in circumstances where taxpayers use business
entities to mask criminal activities.25
In addition, enhanced EOI would help tax authorities audit
aggressive international tax planning.2 6 As noted above, taxpayers
have knowledge of their specific facts and circumstances while tax
authorities must find and assess noncompliant tax returns without
such knowledge.27 Accordingly, the information battle often takes
place between insiders (taxpayers) and outsiders (tax authorities).
These endlessly varied fact patterns combined with the tax
complexity noted previously significantly raise enforcement costs for
tax authorities.
From an international equity perspective, global financial
transparency via EOJ may also encourage good governance in low
income countries where foreign multinational firms exploit natural
25. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-318, OFFSHORE TAX EVASION:
IRS HAS COLLECTED BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, BUT MAY BE MISSING CONTINUED EVASION
1 (2013) [hereinafter GAO, OFFSHORE TAX EVASION]; see also Tax Haven Banks and
U.S. Tax Compliance: Hearing Before the S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of
the Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov't Affairs, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 n. 1 (2008)
(estimating a $100 billion annual loss from both individual tax evasion and corporate
tax planning "abuses").
26. In 2013, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) and the G20 began to explore how to jointly tackle the problem of tax planning
with tax havens, leading to revenue losses in relatively high tax countries like the
United States. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 17 (2013) [hereinafter OECD Base
Erosion Report]. The United States has ongoing domestic reform efforts to address
aggressive international tax avoidance strategies (i.e., the legal efforts by
multinational firms to lower their global tax liabilities) as well as international tax
evasion (i.e., the criminal efforts by US citizens and residents to avoid taxes generally
through purposeful non-disclosure of offshore income or properties). For background
discussion, see, for example, UNITED STATES SENATE, MINORITY STAFF OF THE
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY: THE
ROLE OF ACCOUNTANTS, LAWYERS, AND FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS 3 (Washington: U.S.
Senate, 2003) (describing how a small sample of taxpayers had managed to reduce
federal tax revenues by $1.4 billion through the use of tax shelter arrangements); see
also THE WHITE HOUSE AND DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, PRESIDENT'S FRAMEWORK FOR
BUSINESS TAX REFORM 7-8, 13-15 (Feb. 2012) (discussing the need for reform to inhibit
the usage of aggressive cross-border tax planning that reduces US tax revenues). In
recent years there have been public outcries, mainly within the United States and the
United Kingdom, against perceived aggressive international tax planning. See, e.g.,
Simon Nevill and Jill Treanor, Starbucks to pay £20m in tax over next two years after
customer revolt, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 6, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/
business/2012/dec/06/starbucks-to-pay- 10m-corporation-tax [http://perma.cc/5X8P-
93QQ] (archived Sept. 24, 2017).
27. Under transaction cost approaches, an investment is "transaction-specific"
when it would not have been undertaken were it not for the given transaction. Such
investments are those made to support a specific private sector relationship; they
would be inefficient (and therefore not undertaken) outside the context of that
relationship. Brem & Tucha, supra note 19, at 129.
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resources without paying any significant tax (that is, the so-called
resource curse).2 8 In addition, governments may wish to inhibit the
ability of tax systems to distort economic decision making, which
reduces economic growth as firms deploy resources for tax reasons
and not out of economic rationales (hence resources do not get
deployed to their most productive uses). Greater global financial
transparency also works against the agency problem noted above
where the agent (managers) hides uboptimal performance from its
principal (shareholders). Finally, EOI could help law enforcement
officials detect and disrupt cross-border terrorist financing, promoting
national security objectives.29
On the other hand, governments often assert the need for "tax
competitive" rules to support their domestic industries' efforts to
engage in cross-border activities.30 For this reason, governments
around the world pass tax laws to effectively subsidize the
international operations of their resident taxpayers who, it is
thought, will be in a better position to compete with foreign firms.3 1
Similarly, governments may heed taxpayers who advocate that
28. See discussion infra notes 55-59.
29. See Shima Baradaran, Michael Findley, Daniel Nielson & Jason Sharman,
Funding Terror, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 493-494 (2014) (discussing the potential use by
terrorists of offshore tax haven intermediaries). But see Richard Gordon, Response: A
Tale of Two Studies: The Real Story of Terrorism Financing, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE
269, 281 (2014) (claiming that no studies have shown usage by terrorists of tax havens
as financial intermediaries).
30. For instance, some observers claim the United States should modify its tax
laws to exempt foreign active business income from taxation. See Mihir A. Desai and
James Hines Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 NAT'L TAX J. 487 passim
(2003) (arguing that the United States should move toward an exemption tax system to
maximize national and global welfare). Notably, there was also significant policy and
academic opposition to the reform on the basis that a reformed residence-based system
would better serve US economic interests as well as promote a fairer system based on
ability-to-pay principles. See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming Jr. et al., Designing a U.S.
Exemption System for Foreign Income When the Treasury is Empty, 13 FIA. TAX REV.
397 passim (2012) (elaborating on the design contours of an exemption system,
assuming effective reform of the residence-based tax system is not politically feasible);
Lawrence Lokken, Territorial Taxation: Why Some U.S. Multinationals May be Less
than Enthusiastic about the Idea (and Some Ideas They Really Dislike), 59 SMU L.
REV. 751, 770-71 (2006). Critics of the tax competitiveness criterion state that it is not
grounded in any substantive tax policy and should not serve as a guide to international
tax policy. See Paul R. McDaniel, Territorial vs Worldwide International Tax Systems:
Which is Better for the U.S.?, 8 FLA. TAX REV 283, 285 n.3 (2007).
31. While many governments appear to have similar international tax policy
positions on the surface, they maintain special rules to give tax breaks to multinational
firms. For instance, while the United States ostensibly maintains a residence-based
system that strives to tax foreign source active business income, various loopholes
actually promote 'self-help territoriality' that enables multinational firms to reduce
global tax bills. See OFF. OF TAX POL'Y, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, APPROACHES TO
IMPROVE THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. BUSINESS TAX SySTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 55, 57 (2007). The main loophole is that US tax law does not tax foreign
source active income generated by a related non-resident corporation until the income
is repatriated hence enabling tax deferral.
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enhanced EOI will unduly raise compliance and other costs, and
harm firm competitiveness.
In addition to offering special tax breaks for multinational firms,
some governments subvert global financial transparency through
their financial secrecy laws to encourage more inward foreign direct
and portfolio investments. These governments face a moral hazard as
EOJ initiatives may make their countries less attractive to
nonresident investors who wish to maintain anonymity (out of fear of
sanctions from the home country).
For instance, US state corporate laws at times allow taxpayers to
mask the identity of the beneficial owner of shares of business
entities (e.g., Delaware limited liability companies).32 Under this
view, certain governments are purposefully undermining global
financial transparency initiatives by raising transaction costs for
other governments, making it difficult or impossible for them to
enforce their domestic tax laws over income generated abroad (see
also Part III.C).
In summary, governments around the world face different and
often conflicting incentives surrounding possible EQI reforms. These
mixed incentives have contributed to a mishmash of complex recent
EGI reforms.
B. Overview of Recent Reforms
The modern EOJ system was initiated by the League of Nations
in the post-World War I environment. A report by the famed "group of
four" tax economists laid the foundation for the modern international
tax regime by setting out which country should be entitled to tax
32. In terms of ranking countries according to how much financial secrecy they
provide foreign investors, the United States is ranked at number 3, Germany at 8,
Japan at 12; these countries are ranked above others than certain tax havens,
including Barbados at 22, Bahamas at 25, and Liechtenstein at 36. Other OECD
countries such as Canada (ranked at 29) and the United Kingdom (ranked at 15) also
maintain financial secrecy laws and policies that offer stronger secrecy protection than
many so-called tax havens. TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, FINANCIAL SECRECY INDEX 2015:
METHODOLOGY 75-79 (2015). The matter becomes more complicated because federal
countries such as the United States and Canada grant constitutional powers to
subnational units (that is, states and provinces) to develop corporate and tax laws. For
example, Delaware and certain other US states deploy corporate laws that enable
secrecy by making it difficult or impossible to obtain the names of individual
shareholders. A report from Global Financial Integrity also found that the United
States was the world's foremost destination for foreign capital, with over $2 trillion in
private, non-resident deposits. The United States has also been characterized as
"noncompliant" with global financial standards under the Financial Action Task Force
because the owners of US limited liability companies are hidden from public view. See
Ann Hollingshead, Privately Held, Non-Resident Deposits in Secrecy Jurisdictions,
GLOBAL FIN. INTEGRITY (2010),
http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/gfi-privatelyheld-web.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8XCU-9YH9] (archived Sept. 24, 2017).
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cross-border transactions and hence enjoy the resulting tax
revenues.3 3 In addition, the report recommended the adoption of
bilateral tax treaty provisions that would contemplate sharing tax
information to inhibit "fiscal evasion" (now generally referred to as
"offshore tax evasion").34 Earlier League of Nations model tax treaties
eventually evolved into the OECD model tax treaty, first put into
place in 1963.3s There are now over three thousand bilateral tax
treaties in the world that contain an exchange of information (EOI)
provision similar to Article 26 of the OECD model.36
The following discussion overviews four recent key EOI
developments: a unilateral effort by the United States commonly
known as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA); the
promotion of bilateral Tax Information Exchange Agreements
(TIEAs); a multilateral effort to share taxpayer information called the
CRS; and another multilateral reform advocating cross-border
sharing of multinational firm tax and financial information called
CBCR.
1. Unilateralism via US FATCA
All US citizens and residents must pay US taxes on their
worldwide income.3 7 US policymakers worry that many of these
individuals fail to report this income, leading to revenue losses of
billions of dollars each year.3 8 In particular, US citizens living abroad
may not be complying with tax obligations.
Accordingly, legislation commonly known as FATCA was passed
in 2010 to raise revenues from taxing undisclosed offshore income
33. See generally Professors Bruins, Enaudi, Seligman and Sir Josiah Stamp,
Report on Double Taxation Submitted to the Financial Committee (1923).
34. Id. at 8. A subsequent report recommended that model treaties should
build on earlier bilateral tax treaties within Europe. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS,
TECHNICAL EXPERTS TO THE FINANCIAL COMMITTEE OF THE LEAGUE OF. NATIONS,
DOUBLE TAXATION AND TAX EVASION: REPORT AND RESOLUTIONS 12-15 (1925).
35. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 7-9 (2010), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-condensed-
version-2010 mtc cond-2010-en [https://perma.cc/GDP9-TD6P] (archived Oct. 15, 2017)
(subscription required) [hereinafter OECD model tax treaty]. For background
discussion, see Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S.
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L. J. 1027, 1066-89 (1997).
36. See Victor Thuronyi, Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Tax, Treaty, 26
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1641, 1641 (2001) (discussing the influence of the OECD model tax
treaty on the global network of bilateral tax treaties).
37. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (2010) ("[G]ross income means all income from whatever
source derived.").
38. U.S. Senate, supra note 15, at 1; Martin A. Sullivan, U.S. Citizens Hide
Hundreds of Billions in Cayman Accounts, 103 TAX NOTES 956, 958 (2004) (reviewing
an estimate of $70 billion in revenue losses from individual tax evasion).
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generated by US citizens and others.3 9 Under FATCA, foreign banks
must provide financial information concerning any account-holding
"US person" (including citizens and residents living abroad) directly
to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). If the foreign banks do not
cooperate, the United States threatened to impose a punitive
withholding tax on cross-border bank transactions from foreign
countries.40 More technically, under FATCA any foreign financial
institution affiliated with a US financial institution that does not
cooperate will be subjected to a 30 percent withholding tax on all
payments.41 From a practical perspective and due to the importance
of US banks to the global financial community, most foreign banks
must comply or they may be effectively prevented from conducting
business in many circumstances.
To enter into compliance, many foreign governments agreed to
an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) with the US government to
implement FATCA.42 For instance, Canada signed an IGA with the
United States where Canadian banks must collect financial
information concerning any identified US persons and send this first
39. The initial legislation, entitled the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
(FATCA), was not enacted. H.R. 3933, 1111h Cong. (2009). The legislation was
subsequently passed within a large omnibus legislative package that was mainly
directed at job creation. See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No.
111-147, § 501, 124 Stat. 71 (2010). The provisions to implement FATCA are now
contained in sections 1471 to 1474 of the Internal Revenue Code (Sup. 2011). FATCA is
estimated to raise less than $9 billion in ten years. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
ESTIMATED REVENUE OF THE REVENUE PRovISIONS CONTAINED IN SENATE
AMENDMENT 3310, THE "HIRING INCENTIVES to RESTORE EMPLOYMENT ACT," UNDER
CONSIDERATION BY THE SENATE, JCX-5-10 (Feb. 23, 2010), Doc. 2010-3977, 2010 TNT
36-20.
40. For discussion, see Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation
under High-Penalty Regimes, 44 CONN. L. REV. 675, 693-700 (2012) (claiming the
United States should develop a norm that encourages financial institution
transparency).
41. Non-US financial institutions must report to the US government about
their accounts held by US persons. The rules apply to payments of investment income
or gain made from the United States to "foreign financial institutions" (FFIs). I.R.C. §
1471 (2010). A 30% withholding tax applies to payments to FFIs unless they have
agreed to obtain and report information about the account holders and submit to
"verification and due diligence procedures." I.R.C. §§ 1471(b)(1), 1473 (2010). If the FFI
has entered into an agreement with the US government then the 30% withholding tax
only applies to accounts held by "recalcitrant account holders" who refuse to provide
the information necessary to identify them as US persons and/or who do not waive
bank secrecy law hurdles to the disclosure of their identity. I.R.C. § 1471 (2010).
42. For discussion and critique of FATCA, see Scott D. Michel & H. David
Rosenbloom, FATCA and Foreign Bank Accounts: Has the U.S. Overreached?, 62 TAX
NOTES INT'L 709 passim (discussing background and implications of FATCA and then
the prospect of repealing FATCA or dealing with it in an alternative way); Allison
Christians & Arthur J. Cockfield, Submissions to the Department of Finance on
FATCA 22-32 (March 10, 2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2407264
[http://perma.cc/9UBL-LVTW] (archived Sept. 24, 2017).
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to the Canadian tax authorities for subsequent ransfer to the IRS.4 3
By January 1, 2017, 113 countries had agreed to an IGA.44 FATCA
arguably encouraged other countries to pursue the automatic
exchange of tax information.45
2. Bilateralism via Tax Information Exchange Agreements
As mentioned in the Introduction, the more recent push for
enhanced EOI began with the OECD Harmful Tax Competition
Project in 1998 (it would later be named the Forum on Harmful Tax
Practices).46 The report encouraged the adoption of agreements
between OECD countries and low or nil tax jurisdictions (commonly
referred to as tax havens although sometimes termed "international
financial centers"). In 2002, the OECD developed a model TIEA to
serve as a template for these new treaties.4 7 By January 1, 2017, over
seven hundred bilateral TIEAs had been signed.48
A major drawback of TIEAs is that they operate on the basis of
"information on request." For instance, if the UK government wanted
to find out about the dealings of a UK resident taxpayer with a
Singaporean bank, then the UK authorities would need to identify
the relevant bank and specify the name of the taxpayer and the
nature of the information they need. This places governments in a
catch-22 position because offshore monies are typically held in
anonymous accounts and the tax authorities do not have sufficient
information to request the relevant taxpayer information in the first
place. The most comprehensive analysis of TIEAs to date suggests
that, while TIEAs helpfully established international norms
surrounding EOI and global financial transparency, they largely
43. The IGA was based on a model agreement. See U.S. TREASURY DEPT.,
Model Intergovernmental Agreement to Improve Tax Compliance and to Implement
FATCA, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA
.aspx [http://perma.ccHZA4-USZV] (archived Sept. 24, 2017).
44. Id.
45. See Itai Grinberg, Beyond FATCA: An Evolutionary Model for the
International Tax System 2 (Georgetown Working Paper, Draft, 2014); Commitment
Projector, supra note 16, at 101-04.
46. For discussion, see Robert T. Kudrle, The OECD and the International Tax
Regime: Persistence Pays Off, 16 J. COMP. POL. 201 (2014) (claiming OECD
institutional processes effectively promoted EOI reforms via horizontal diffusion of
policy).
47. OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND EXcHANGE OF INFORMATION,
MOVING FORWARD ON THE GLOBAL STANDARDS OF TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES 4 (2009).
48. OECD, TAX INFORMATION EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS (TIEAs),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-
information/taxinformationexchangeagreementstieas.htm [http://perma.cc/3RW9-
X45MI] (archived Sept. 24, 2017).
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failed to reduce offshore tax evasion or aggressive international tax
planning.49
3. Multilateralism via the Common Reporting Standard
The OECD reforms were later joined by the G20 to more broadly
represent countries that would be subject to EOI obligations.50 The
OECD and the G20 supervise the Global Forum on Transparency and
Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, which at this writing has
135 participating countries.51 Both the OECD and the G20 came to
view the TIEA approach as deficient, especially with respect to the
"information on request" approach noted above.
Importantly, in 2013 with the G20 Summit at St. Petersburg, the
G20 and OECD endorsed the CRS as the global standard.52 A related
multilateral agreement contemplates the automatic sharing of bulk
taxpayer information across borders.5 3 Under this approach, a
participating country such as Singapore is supposed to pass laws that
mandate the automatic collection by banks of foreign investor tax
information, then transfer this information to other participating
countries such as the United Kingdom. Through peer review
processes, the Global Forum tries to ensure that its members
implement and comply with promised EOI standards and obligations.
As of July 2016, 101 countries have agreed to implement the
CRS.54 The United States so far has refused to sign on, preferring to
focus on its domestic initiatives such as FATCA.
4. Multilateralism and Tracking Multinational Firm Tax Payments
The policy push for the next EOI reform-called Country by
Country Reporting (CBCR)-began in 2002 with a related effort by
49. See DAVID KERZNER & DAVID CHODIKOFF, INTERNATIONAL TAX EVASION IN
THE GLOBAL INFORMATION AGE 344 (2016).
50. For background, see ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION: WHAT IT IS, How IT WORKS,
BENEFITS, WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE (2012) [hereinafter AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE]
(surveying different national approaches to automatic exchanges).
51. Id.
52. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION IN TAX MATTERS
(2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264216525-en [http://perma.cclCT6J-GPMM]
(archived Sept. 24, 2017). A second edition was released in 2017.
53. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CRS
MULTILATERAL COMPETENT AUTHORITY AGREEMENT (2014). The OECD agreement in
turn is based on Article 6 of an earlier multilateral agreement. See ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CONVENTION ON MUTUAL
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS art. 6 (1998).
54. OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY, AEIO: STATUS OF COMMITMENTS
(2016).
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the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).5 5 EITI
encourages governments and extractive industries (that is, companies
involved with mining and other resource extraction) to provide more
financial disclosures to the public. The purpose behind this initiative
is to inhibit the "resource curse," mentioned in the Introduction,
whereby developing countries often collect little to no tax revenues
when multinational firms exploit their natural resources.56
Participating companies and national governments can
voluntarily adopt EITI transparency measures that include country-
by-country reporting whereby taxpayers disclose where, and how
much, taxes are paid. At this writing, thirty-one countries have
'complied with EITI standards.5 7 The implementation of EITI led to
calls by nongovernmental organizations and others for more
comprehensive financial reporting by multinational firms.
Another important development surrounds the passage of the US
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 that called for mandatory reporting of
geographic earnings for all listed companies involved in the extractive
sector (with the exception of the logging industry).58 In August 2012,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted
implementing rules to ensure that public companies followed the new
regime.59
In 2013, the OECD also began an ambitious plan to counter
"base erosion and profit shifting" (BEPS) by multinational firms.
BEPS refers to the many international tax avoidance plans that firms
adopt to legally reduce their global tax liabilities, often by shifting
paper profits to tax havens.60 After three years of reform efforts, the
55. Information concerning this program is set out at the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative website at https://eiti.org/ [http://perma.cclSNP2-PHBU]
(archived Sept. 24, 2017). For discussion of EITI initiatives as well as their rationales
and potential effectiveness, see Christians, supra note 7, at 1385-89, 1398-1402. We
discuss the arguments forand against CBCR along with possible extension to limited
public disclosures. See Cockfield & MacArthur, supra note 17, at 640-44, 657-60.
56. Although there are some early indications that the EITI has been at least
partially successful, the overall results of empirical studies have been mixed given the
relatively short time period since the founding of the EITI. See, e.g., Caitlin C.
Corrigan, Breaking the Resource Curse: Transparency in the Natural Resource Sector
and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 40 RES. POL'Y 17 passim (2012).
57. Implementation Status, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY
INITIATIVE, https://eiti.org/countries [http://perma.cc/CCU8-3BVB] (archived Sept. 24,
2017).
58. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203 (2010); see also THE WHITE HOUSE AND U.S. DEP'T. OF TREASURY, THE
PRESIDENT'S FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM 7-8, 13-15 (2012) (discussing the
need for reform to inhibit the usage of aggressive cross-border tax planning that
reduces US tax revenues).
59. See Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 81 Fed. Reg.
49359 (July 27, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 249) (indicating taxpayers
must comply with the new rules by 2018).
60. See discussion supra note 26. The fact that aggressive tax planning is on
the rise is supported by empirical research by accounting academics. See, e.g., Kenneth
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OECD produced its final recommendations, including for all
participating countries to adopt CBCR.61
Under CBCR, multinational firms for the first time would need
to disclose to home and foreign tax authorities their tax and other
payments in every country where they operate.6 2 Pursuant to the
current tax law and securities law regime in the United States and
many other countries, these multinational firms generally only
disclose tax information in the country where they reside.63 CBCR
also only applies to very large multinational firms with annual
consolidated group revenues that exceed EUR 750 million (or roughly
USD 850 million). 64
CBCR is mainly directed at helping governments audit
aggressive international tax avoidance to reduce revenue losses in
high tax countries. Under the proposed approach, a parent
corporation files a CBCR report following an OECD template; the
report will then be shared with other countries that are participating
in automatic information exchanges.65 It is hoped tax authorities will
be able to identify important indicators such as their country's
relative share of global tax revenues.6 6 As of January 27, 2017, fifty-
Klassen & Stacie Laplante, Are U.S. Multinational Corporations Becoming More
Aggressive Income Shifters?, 50 J. ACC. RES. 1245, 1248 (2012) (concluding that US
multinational firms have increased income shifting over last twenty years in part due
to changing regulatory costs). On the other hand, certain perspectives in tax economics
suggest that multinational firms are not becoming more aggressive over time with
respect to their tax planning and income shifting initiatives, which in any event only
lead to modest revenue losses. See, e.g., James R. Hines Jr., How Serious Is the
Problem of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting?, 62 CAN. TAX J. 443, 448-52 (2014).
61. CBCR falls under action 13 of the OECD BEPS action plan. See
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ACTION PLAN ON
BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, at Action 13 (2013),
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf [https://perma.cc/CA78-WU2X] (archived
Oct. 15, 2017).
62. For discussion of the political push for CBCR, see Dries Lesage and Yusuf
Kagar, Tax Justice Through Country-by-Country Reporting: An Analysis of the Idea's
Political Journey, in TAX JUSTICE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMIC OF GLOBAL
CAPITALISM, 1945 TO THE PRESENT 262-63 (Jeremy Leaman & Attiya Waris eds., 2013).
63. For discussion of how current U.S. tax law compares with other countries,
see OFF. OF TAX POL'Y, supra note 31. At times, multinational firms report on foreign
revenues and taxes paid on a regional basis instead of a country-by-country basis.
64. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
GUIDANCE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND
COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING 4 (Feb. 6, 2015). It is, however, estimated that these
large firms control approximately 90% of the world's corporate revenue. Id.
65. Public interest groups such as OXFAM and the BEPS Monitoring Group
have advocated for public disclosure of CBCR information. OXFAM, COMMENT LETTER
ON OECD BASE EROSION REPORT (2014), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-
pricing/volume3.pdf [http://perma.cc/C8GV-JF5U] (archived Sept. 24, 2017); see also
THE BEPS MONITORING GROUP, OECD BEPS SCORECARD 12-13 (2014),
https:/Ibepsmonitoringgroup.files.wordpress.com/2014/1O/oecd-beps-scorecard.pdf
[http://perma.cclRXZ5-MY3V] (archived Sept. 24, 2017).
66. Concerns have been raised by tax authorities that CBCR may promote high
taxpayer compliance costs, which could hinder its adoption. See Lee A. Sheppard,
Country Reporting Burdensome, HMRC Official Says, 73 Tax Notes Int'l 589 (2014).
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seven countries had signed a related multilateral agreement where
they agreed to implement CBCR.67
C. Summary
As things currently stand, the global financial system can be
characterized as opaque, as tax authorities generally know little to
nothing beyond taxpayer self-disclosure. Accordingly, a tax authority
finds itself at a distinct informational disadvantage, especially
regarding purposeful nondisclosures relating to offshore tax evasion.
While there appears to be increasing policy and academic support for
EOI initiatives that promote global financial transparency, the
current international tax regime, with its high transaction costs for
taxpayers and tax authorities, does not seem particularly amenable
to producing optimal outcomes.
In particular, governments are boundedly rational in the sense
they have imperfect information to discern whether their
international tax laws and policies promote sought-after national
interest objectives. On the one hand, they want to promote firm
competitiveness via preferential tax treatment of foreign income. In
addition, many countries maintain financial secrecy laws to
encourage inward investments. On the other hand, governments
want a fair tax system that maximizes revenue collection. These
mixed political incentives reduce the potential for welfare-maximizing
cooperative moves among governments.
Nevertheless, in recent years worries about revenue losses from
offshore evasion and aggressive international tax planning have
brought governments to the bargaining table. The complex network of
tax treaties, TIEAs, and IGAs, as well as larger multilateral reforms
focusing on CRS and CBCR, reflect this state of affairs, raising
transaction costs for all parties.
All of these efforts seek to provide governments with more and
better tax information and reduce costs through agreement on
underlying EOI rules and principles. The reforms, however, largely
do not address how financial secrecy laws subvert global financial
transparency initiatives. Nor do they address legal technical
complexity that raises transaction costs, and makes it even harder for
67. ORGANISATION FOR EcoNOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, SEVEN
MORE JURISDICTIONS SIGN TAX CO-OPERATION AGREEMENT TO ENABLE AUTOMATIC
SHARING OF COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY INFORMATION (Jan. 27, 2017),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/seven,-more-jurisdictions-sign-tax-co-operation-agreement-to-
enable-automatic-sharing-of-country-by-country-information-beps-action- 1 3.htm
[http://perma.cclY8U5-N44C] (archived Sept. 24, 2017); see also ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, MULTILATERAL COMPETENT AUTHORITY
AGREEMENT FOR THE AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTS
(2014), http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/about-automatic-exchange/cbc-
mcaa.pdf [http://perma.cc/P6BL-YP8H] (archived Sept. 24, 2017).
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low and middle income countries to implement and enforce EOI.
While the EOI reforms are positive steps, governments are still
generally faced with high transaction costs and an opaque global
financial system as they struggle to address key policy challenges, a
topic to which the Article now turns.
III. ASSESSING THE CENTRAL LEGAL AND POLICY CHALLENGES
This Part emphasizes how, to promote enforceability, the ideal
EOI system delivers high quality tax information while providing
needed taxpayer privacy legal protections.
A. Information Quality
A key issue in cross-border tax information exchanges involves
the quality of exchanged taxpayer information.68 The CRS and other
initiatives emphasize the automatic exchange of so-called bulk
taxpayer information. According to the OECD, for example, automatic
exchanges of bulk taxpayer information are the most effective way to
help assist tax authorities with enforcing their cross-border tax
laws.6 9 As suggested by tax compliance writings, however, more
information is not necessarily better.70 Tax authorities' may be
overwhelmed with data and may not have the resources to parse
through it to identify helpful leads. As subsequently explored, high
quality information is tax and non-tax data that is available, useful,
and verifiable.
1. Available Information
Available information is tax and non-tax information that is
potentially accessible by governments for EOI purposes. A tax
authority must first identify a. taxpayer and related offshore income
before it can conduct risk analysis that accounts for factors such as
size of the taxpayer and industry in which the taxpayer works.
Writings on tax compliance emphasize how tax authorities can tap
68. See, e.g., Robert Couzin, Imposing and Collecting Tax, in THE TAXATION OF
BUSINESS PROFITS UNDER TAX TREATIES 171, 186 (Brian J. Arnold et al., eds., 2003)
("The key is an integrated [cross-border] information system that can tolerate the
volume of input and produce useful output.") (emphasis added).
69. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
Module on Automatic (or Routine) Exchange of Information, in MANUAL ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION PROVISIONS FOR TAX PURPOSES 1, 3
(2006).
70. For discussion, see Wei Cui, Information Reporting and State Capacity 5
(Mar. 18, 2016) (preliminary draft), https://www.ntanet.org/wp-content/uploads/
proceedings/2016/058-cui-information-reporting-state-paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7JXT-QRYF] (archived Oct. 15, 2017) (questioning the link between
information reporting and tax compliance).
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into existing information streams to bolster and confirm a taxpayer's
disclosed income.7 1 In particular, third party reporting and tax-
withholding disclosures can provide information to tax authorities to
allow them to better gauge risks of offshore tax evasion and
aggressive international tax planning.
Third party reporting of tax and financial information can be
cross-matched with transferred tax information to support
information quality. Empirical studies generally suggest hat third
party reporting (that is, information provided by someone other than
the taxpayer such as a bank reporting interest income) goes a long
way to addressing the "tax gap."72 Even self-assessment systems,
such as the one deployed in the United States, are broadly supported
by third party reporting efforts (e.g., employers report to tax
authorities how much income was paid to an employee).
In addition to third party reporting, effective tax withholding is
an important element of tax administration. For instance, different
types of withholding account for roughly 75 percent of personal
income tax revenues for OECD countries.7 3 Value-added taxes (VATs)
are sometimes thought to be superior to income taxes from an
administrative perspective in part because VATs provide rebates to
taxpayers (other than final consumers) and hence operate in a similar
fashion to a creditable withholding tax. Similarly, "traditional"
withholding taxes on cross-border passive income (that is, rents,
royalties, dividends, and interest) help to enforce tax laws by
imposing the disclosure and withholding obligations on the payor.
The most prominent example of information exchange and
withholding for cross-border purposes is the European Union's
Savings Directive where member countries automatically exchange
information about portfolio nonresident interest payments
(alternatively, if an exchange of information does not occur then the
country where the investment takes place will tax the interest and
send the bulk of the resulting tax revenues to the residence
country).74 This EOI measure ensures tax payment via withholding
71. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax
Gap: When Is Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1739-41
(2010) (discussing six factors to evaluate whether information reporting is likely to be
efficient).
72. The tax gap is the amount of revenue loss between the amount of tax
required to be paid under tax law and the amount that is actually paid by taxpayers.
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, THE TAX GAP (2017), https://www.irs.gov/uac/the-tax-
gap [https://perma.cc/MGM9-8C78] (archived Sept. 24, 2017) (estimating the 2010 tax
gap at roughly $458 billion).
73. IMF, Current Challenges in Revenue Mobilization: Improving Tax
Compliance, Staff Report 18 (Jan. 2015), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/
eng/2015/020215a.pdf [https://perma.cc/EB45-ZXFQ] (archived Oct. 15, 2017).
74. Since the Directive was issued in 2003, heightened information sharing has
been promoted among EU governments as well as some non-EU European tax havens
such as Luxembourg. In addition, one EU country (Austria) and five non-EU countries
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or provides the government with another source of information to
contrast against the taxpayer's tax filings. The Directive was repealed
in 2015 in favor of pursuing automatic cross-border tax information
exchanges under the OECD's CRS outlined in Part II.B.3.75
A similar measure to the older Savings Directive may be needed
to promote effective EOI at the global level. As Reuven Avi-Yonah has
explained, as long as there is one non-participating country then
undisclosed investment monies can flow to this outlier.76 His
proposed solution resembles the EU Savings Directive as it would
impose a withholding tax on these monies whenever they flow to a
noncooperative country. Building on these views, I previously
outlined how online technologies-an extranet among participating
countries-could be used to impose such a withholding tax."
Another major barrier to effective EOI is that many countries,
especially tax havens, simply do not track these tax information
sources so that they are unable to exchange this information when
called upon to do so. As subsequently discussed, many low and middle
income countries also lack the administrative resources to collect and
transfer this information (see Part III.C).
2. Useful Information
Not all tax information is created equal. From a tax
administrator's perspective, some sources of information, or
relationships among different sources, are superior to others.
Governments should hence focus on ensuring that available
information is useful for tax authorities.
To start, the information exchanged needs to be relatable to
other recipient country taxpayer information. The most frequently
touted solution is for countries to agree on a common taxpayer
identification number.7 8 This number could be matched against the
unique one provided by each government; a software program could
readily identify whether the taxpayer had disclosed all of his or her
sources of foreign income.
(Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and Switzerland) currently maintain a
separate regime where they tax the cross-border investment (at rate of 35%) and pass
on 75% of the receipts to the country of residence. See generally Council Directive
2003/48/EC, 2003 0. J. (L 157/38).
75. See Council Directive 2014/107/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 359/1). This Directive
entered into force on January 1, 2016.
76. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis
of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1667-69 (2000).
77. Arthur J. Cockfield, Transforming the Internet into a Taxable Forum: A
Case Study in E-Commerce Taxation, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1235-63 (2001).
78. See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
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Another need is for transferred information to identify the
beneficial owner of an offshore asset (that is, the ultimate human
being who owns the asset). One of the main barriers to effective EOI
is the lack of information in this area as a result of financial secrecy
laws that mask the identities of beneficial owners (see also Parts II.C
and IV.B).7 9
In addition, the ability of tax authorities to engage in taxpayer
segmentation (that is, separating taxpayers into different risk
groups) is increasingly seen as a necessary step to better identify
risks. Hence transferred information that enables taxpayer
segmentation promotes information quality. For example, many
OECD governments have created audit groups that focus on high net
worth individuals, which seems appropriate given their larger share
of resources and potential contribution of tax revenues.80 High net
worth individuals also tend to be more mobile internationally and to
engage in more aggressive tax planning structured by tax advisors.8 1
Governments have also expanded information reporting for entities
owned by these individuals along with broader disclosure of foreign
assets and transactions.8 2
Another way tax authorities are looking to bolster the quality of
transferred information is by cross-indexing it against non-tax data
(see Part IV.A for a discussion of data analytics and non-tax data).
For an example of an initiative to reduce tax cheating, Greek auditors
took satellite photos from Google Earth as well as aerial photos from
helicopters to collect images of pools, luxury cars, and villas to help
sustain audits against taxpayers who disclosed few assets or little
income; one such. audit revealed that Athenian suburbs did not have
324 swimming pools, as had been disclosed by taxpayers, but rather
16,974.83
Finally, promoting disclosures by smaller offshore financial
intermediaries (e.g., trust, finance, and other offshore service
providers) will also promote information quality and help tax
authorities understand the nature and amount of offshore
investments held by their residents. Current reform efforts, including
by the Financial Action Tax Force (FATF), focus on enhancing
79. See OHCHR, supra note 4, at 20, 22.
80. Countries with such audit groups include Canada, the United States,
France, Ireland, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, South Africa, and Japan. See THE
TAXATION OF BUSINESS PROFITS UNDER TAx TREATIES, supra note 68, at 27. The top one
percent in the UK and the US now account for approximately one quarter and one
third, respectively, of personal income tax revenues. IMF, supra note 73, at 26.
81. Id. at 27.
82. Id.
83. See Daniel Steinvorth, Finding Swimming Pools with Google Earth: Greek
Government Hauls in Billions in Back Taxes, DER SPIEGEL (2011),
http://www.spiegel.de/internationalleurope/finding-swimming-pools-with-google-earth-
greek-government-hauls-in-billions-in-back-taxes-a-709703.html
[https://perma.cclG32D-ZAUW] (archived Sept. 24, 2017).
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disclosure obligations for financial intermediaries to report on
offshore assets maintained by foreigners.84
As revealed by an analysis of tax haven data leaks, a major
vulnerability in these efforts is the lack of reporting by hundreds of
offshore service providers, such as trust, finance, or other financial
service providers based in tax havens.8 5 In many cases, these offshore
service providers at times did not report accurate tax and financial
information on cross-border investments as required by FATF
recommendations.8 6 Noncompliance resulted from a lack of due
diligence, willful neglect, and legal insulation through
indemnification agreements between the offshore service provider
and the nonresident investor.
Yet even these smaller players often have funds transferred to
larger financial institutions, which generally strive to comply with
FATF requirements (or, more technically, the domestic legislation
that implements these requirements). Reporting obligations can be
cross-referenced against amounts transferred to and from the larger
institutions to smaller banks with help from offshore service
providers.
Moreover, offshore service providers often manage monies on
behalf of individuals and organizations engaged in offshore tax
evasion (by, for instance, forming a corporate trustee for a
nonresident trust that holds legal title to the illicitly earned
monies).8 7 Tracking the offshore service provider's name along with
any prior compliance problems would provide another important
piece of information for tax and law enforcement authorities (see also
the discussion of a global financial registry in Part IV.C).
3. Verifiable Information
There are several related issues surrounding data verifiability.
Governments need to feel confident that the transferred information
has so-called data integrity.8 8 First, tax authorities need to know who
owned the transferred data that had been collected. Some countries
have laws that provide governments with direct access to a taxpayer's
database while others do not.
Second, governments need assurances that the transferred
information accurately represents the underlying information (e.g.,
84. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, TRANSPARENCY AND BENEFICIAL
OWNERSHIP 40 (Oct. 2014).
85. See Big Data, supra note 5, at 519-522.
86. See id. at 519.
87. Id. at 520.
88. See PROJECT SAGE, DATA STANDARDS, DATA INTEGRITY AND SECURITY
GUIDELINES 7-11(2014); see generally OECD, COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING XML
SCHEMA: USER GUIDE FOR TAX ADMINISTRATIONS AND TAXPAYERS (March 2016) (setting
out standardized reporting guidelines in part to encourage data integrity).
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sales receipts) that gave rise to the data. Evidence should be collected
to show the data was not tampered with by the taxpayer or some
third party. As touched on below, data integrity is related to the issue
of data security in that outside hackers may illegally access, change,
or delete taxpayer information.8 9
B. Taxpayer Privacy
As I explored in another work, there are two discrete but related
elements surrounding effective EOI.9 0 First, the cross-border tax
information exchange should be efficient in that it should promote
low enforcement and administrative costs for tax authorities and low
compliance costs for taxpayers. Second, the exchange must be fair in
that any transferred information will attract a requisite level of legal
protection for taxpayer privacy and other rights. The two issues are
related in that a tax authority will be reluctant to engage in
automatic bulk information exchanges if it worries that its taxpayers'
privacy and other rights will be harmed. This subpart touches on how
taxpayer privacy concerns serve as an ongoing barrier to effective
EOI, as well as how reforms can address this challenge.
1. Taxpayer Privacy as a Human Right
Privacy can be portrayed as a critical human right in a free and
just society.9 1 This human right protects an individual's right to
freedom of expression, freedom of mobility, freedom to engage in
political dissent, and so on. Accordingly, Article 12 of the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights maintains, "No one.
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks."92
In privacy law writings, financial information privacy, including
taxpayer information, is typically cited as one of the most sensitive
forms of privacy because it can provide a detailed profile of an
individual's identity and behavior (e.g., an individual's tax return
89. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
90. See Arthur J. Cockfield, Protecting Taxpayer Privacy under Enhanced
Cross-border Tax Information Exchange: Toward a Multilateral Taxpayer Bill of
Rights, 42 U.B.C. L. Rev. 419, 454 (2010) [hereinafter Protecting Taxpayer Privacy].
91. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L. J. 475, 477-78 (1968) (claiming that
privacy grounds fundamental relations of love, friendship and trust).
92. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948). In December 2013, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution
68/167, which expressed concern at the negative impact that surveillance and
interception of communications may have on human rights. While the resolution
focused on mass surveillance techniques, it would also apply to the possible misuse of
bulk tax information exchanged across borders.
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includes information on donations, health matters, income levels,
disability status, names and ages of any dependents, and so on).9 3
Taxpayer privacy has been protected for reasons that include
personal security as criminals might be tempted to kidnap the
children of individuals whose wealth was revealed by tax
disclosures.94 In addition, individuals may wish to conceal their
financial dealings to protect against envy or political reprisals.9 5
National financial privacy rights and laws vary around the world
in part because certain cultures are more sensitive to perceived
incursions into financial privacy, potentially as a result of historical
developments. For instance, historical taxpayer privacy concerns-
where a home could be searched, assets seized, and taxpayers
improperly imprisoned without due process protections-served as a
catalyst for the earliest Western laws, including the Charter of
Liberties of 1100 and the Magna Carta of 1215, that sought to bind
the power of the king.9 6 In part because of historical developments,
the United States and other countries pass laws to protect against the
improper collection, use, or disclosure of tax information.9 7 In certain
countries such as the United States and Canada, privacy interests
are additionally protected by constitutional guarantees that cannot
generally be violated by state action (e.g., the right to be free from an
improper search or seizure).9 8
All of this has led to serious government concerns that
transferred tax information will not be protected to the extent
provided by the law of the transferring country.9 9 Relatedly,
governments worry about the possible misuse of transferred
information where countries sanction taxpayers for political reasons,
potentially violating human rights.1 00 Another area of concern is the
93. See generally PHILIP BAKER & ANNE-MIEKE GROENHAGEN, THE
PROTECTION OF TAXPAYERS RIGHTS-AN INTERNATIONAL CODIFICATION (2001); see also
Adrian J. Sawyer, A Comparison of New Zealand Taxpayers' Rights with Selected Civil
Law and Common Law Countries-Have New Zealand Taxpayers Been 'Short-
Changed?, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1345, 1348 (1999).
94. Cynthia Blum, Sharing Bank Deposit Information with Other Countries:
Should Tax Compliance or Privacy Claims Prevail, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 579, 603-04 (2004).
95. Id.
96. See generally Arthur J. Cockfield & Jonah Mayles, The Influence of
Historical Tax Law Developments on Anglo-American Law and Politics, 3 COLUM. J.
TAX L. 40 (2013) (discussing English and American tax law developments that
promoted values of liberalism and republicanism).
97. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7213 (providing for criminal penalties for unauthorized
disclosure of taxpayer information by federal employees).
98. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 45 So. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1121 (2002).
99. See generally Blum, supra note 94 (providing a comprehensive discussion f
taxpayer privacy concerns).
100. Id. at 638-39.
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possible triggering of so-called false positives that target innocent
taxpayers based on flawed data.0 1
In addition, there have been ongoing apprehensions urrounding
the interaction between technology and taxpayer privacy for some
time, from concerns surrounding the usage of electronic records in the
1970s, the movement from analog to digital storage in the 1980s,
online return filing and software audits in the 1990s and, more
recently, collecting taxpayer information to tax global digital goods
and services in the 2000s.102 A major barrier to enhanced EOI is the
worry that new technologies, which enable the mass storage and
transmission of detailed taxpayer information, will violate privacy
laws, policies, and interests.03
These worries have gained credence as a result of data leaks
such as WikiLeaks that demonstrated how governments, including
the United States and Canada, conduct surveillance efforts to collect
"economic intelligence" by stealing corporate secrets from overseas
competitors.104 The related tax worry is that governments will misuse
transferred tax and financial information to help domestic companies
and undermine foreign ones.
Finally, the data security of transferred information remains a
significant concern. For instance, the IRS experiences one million
attempts every week to hack its information technology systems.105 If
countries do not adopt appropriate network security safeguards and
protocols then transferred information is at risk of illegal collection,
use, and disclosure.
For all of these reasons, privacy researchers tend to emphasize
theories and analytical frameworks that broadly protect privacy
interests.106 These researchers argue for an expansive definition of
privacy to reduce the chance that privacy rights and interests will be
eroded. The policy outcome is often broad protections for taxpayer
privacy rights in the domestic and international context, which can
serve as a barrier to EOI reforms.
101. Id. at 605.
102. For discussion, see ARTHUR COCKFIELD, WALTER HELLERSTEIN, REBECCA
MILLAR & CHRISTOPHE WAERZEGGERS, TAXING GLOBAL DIGITAL COMMERCE 515-18
(2013).
103. Id.; see Dean, supra note 11, at 668-670.
104. WikiLeaks not only revealed the NSA information collection practices, but
also provided evidence that Canadian spies, including the Communications Security
Establishment of Canada (CSEC), were (bizarrely) spying on the Brazilian mining
ministry. See Colin Freeze & Stephanie Nolen, Charges that Canada Spied on Brazil
Unveil CSEC's Inner Workings, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Oct. 7, 2013),
https://beta.theglobeandmail.comlnews/world/brazil-spying-report-spotlights-canadas-
electronic-eavesdroppers/articlel4720003/?ref-http://www.theglobeandmail.com&
[https://perma.ccNB6U-GVXA] (archived Sept. 24, 2017).
105. Steve R. Johnson, The Future of American Tax Administration: Conceptual
Alternatives and Political Realities, 7 COLUM. J. TAX L. 5, 17 (2016).
106. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 98, at 1114.
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2. Addressing Privacy Challenges
While this matter has been understudied since the push for
enhanced EOI began in the late 1990s, more recent reform efforts
have tried to explicitly engage with taxpayer privacy concerns.
For example, under the Country-by-Country Reporting (CBCR)
reforms noted in Part II.B, governments must agree to provide and
enforce legal protections to maintain the confidentiality of reported
information equivalent to the protection under an income tax treaty
or other EOI agreement.0 7 Further, the automatic transmission of
CBCR information is limited to those countries that satisfy these
requirements. The OECD plans additional reforms to monitor
compliance with the taxpayer privacy commitments.08
In another work, I suggested these EOI efforts could be bolstered
via a multilateral taxpayer bill of rights to provide assurances that
transferred tax and financial information will attract a minimal level
of legal and policy protection.0 9 In particular, this bill of rights could
incorporate widely accepted fair information practices (FIPs) (e.g.,
accountability, notice, choice, access, and security) that serve as the
basis for domestic privacy laws (e.g., Canada's federal privacy law),
international privacy laws (e.g., the European Union's data protection
directive), and administrative guidelines (e.g., the US Federal Trade
Commission's data privacy guidelines).
These FIPs are used to smooth over conflicts caused by the
interaction of different national privacy laws when personal
information crosses borders. FIPs also strive to promote data
integrity and data security. A recent example of their usage is the
2016 European Union-United States Privacy Shield that is designed
to protect individuals' privacy rights when personal data is
transferred from European companies to US ones.110
107. As discussed, the OECD is pursuing a Multilateral Competent Authority
Agreement on the Exchange of Country-by-Country Reports: the purpose of this
agreement is to set forth the rules and procedures for governments to automatically
exchange the CBCR-mandated information. An Annex to this agreement provides a
questionnaire concerning confidentiality and data safeguards to ensure participating
nations have adapted acceptable privacy and confidentiality practices. See
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GUIDANCE, supra
note 64.
108. See id.
109. See generally Protecting Taxpayer Privacy, supra note 90, at 410.
110. Under this agreement, the United States provided the EU with binding
assurances that the access by US government authorities of transferred personal
information for national security purposes will be subject to clear limitations,
safeguards and oversight mechanisms. In addition, EU citizens are offered a
mechanism to seek redress if their rights appear to be violated and an annual joint
review will monitor the implementation of the commitments. See generally EUROPEAN
COMMIssIoN, GUIDE TO THE E.U.-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD 9-19 (2016)
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/citizens-guide-en.pdf
[https://perma.cclD8FJ-L7WX] (archived Sept. 24, 2017).
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Beyond these pragmatic policy responses, researchers need to do
a better job addressing conceptual questions surrounding the use of
privacy law as a barrier to EOI reforms. Consider, for instance, the
distributive justice implications of the current regime: The main
beneficiaries of a lack of global financial transparency are
multinational corporations and high net worth individuals (along
with criminals).1 1' The main bearers of the cost of the regime are
average taxpayers and citizens as a result of the revenue losses
associated with offshore tax evasion and aggressive international tax
planning. Most distressingly, global financial opacity allows corrupt
elites to move and hide stolen monies offshore and encourages
devastating consequences for some low income countries, including
starvation and other human rights violations (see Part I).
In response to similar concerns, privacy researchers have
examined distributive concerns of privacy laws through different
theoretical lenses.112 Under one perspective, privacy researchers
should be wary of conceptual tools that lead to privacy law being used
as a weapon to promote unbalanced outcomes that protect the
interests of the more powerful at the expense of the more vulnerable.
Allen, for instance, discusses how common law notions of "a man's
home is his castle" historically protected household privacy against
police intrusion at times at the expense of vulnerable children and/or
women who were subjected to abuse."3
The analytical approach seems particularly relevant for EOI
reforms as a key purpose of tax systems is to enhafice the overall
welfare of citizens and residents, including the promotion of human
rights. Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, a multilateral treaty adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly, participating countries promise to encourage the
adoption of economic, social, and cultural rights, including the rights
to education and to an adequate standard of living.11 4 To pursue
these goals, governments need to adopt a fair tax system that collects
revenues from wealthy taxpayers, including multinational firms, and
prevents elites from hiding their monies in offshore tax havens.
In particular, broader conceptions of the "social value" of privacy
consider the overall impact of privacy laws and policies on privacy
111. The state of affairs actually incentivizes taxpayers to engage in offshore tax
evasion by lowering the transaction costs they face. See Lee Benham, Licit and Illicit
Responses to Regulation, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 591, 599
(Claude M6nard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2008) (describing how regulatory solutions
can incentivize illegal activities).
112. See generally ANITA ALLEN, WHY PRIVACY ISN'T EVERYTHING: FEMINIST
REFLECTIONS ON PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY (2003); Jane Bailey, Towards An
Equality-Enhancing Conception of Privacy, 31 DALHOUSIE L. J. 267 (2008).
113. ALLEN, supra note 112 at 6.
114. United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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rights of both individuals and communities.115 These views call for
more nuanced analysis in situations where privacy rights protect
powerful taxpayers with foreign investments (along with criminals)
at the expense of the interests of average taxpayers.
C. Enforcement
As discussed throughout this Article, governments are currently
trying to fight two main international tax battles against offshore tax
evasion and aggressive international tax avoidance. Success in these
battles will result in more tax revenues. As Walter Hellerstein notes,
however, success will only be achieved if governments are able to link
their enforcement jurisdiction with their existing legal jurisdiction.1 16
1. Reducing the Underground Economy
With respect to the first battle, much of offshore tax evasion is
related to a country's underground economy (for instance, an off-grid,
cash-only restaurant where the owner squirrels away undisclosed
income in an anonymous offshore account). A variety of incentives
have been discussed to inhibit the underground economy, including
the greater usage of value-added taxes, electronic fiscal devices (e.g.,
electronic cash registers that are certified by the government),
lotteries where consumers can turn in receipts, tax reductions for
proof of payment, and tax rebates for the use of credit/debit card (to
reduce cash transactions).11 7 According to the International Monetary
Fund, these efforts have led to mixed results, at best.11 8
More recently, works have recognized the importance of less
tangible cultural forces in promoting taxpayer compliance (the
cultural forces and social norms are sometimes collectively termed
"taxpayer morale").1 19 These factors influence compliance behavior,
including whether a resident taxpayer feels patriotic toward her
country and whether she thinks she is getting a roughly fair return
on a tax payment.120 Accordingly, it may be difficult for tax law and
115. These conceptions typically rely on an extension of Westin's famed
discussion of information privacy. ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); see
also PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1995); Arthur J Cockfield, Protecting the Social Value of Privacy in the
Context of State Investigations Using New Technologies, 40 U.B.C. L. REV. 41, 66 (2007)
(discussing how the 'social value' of privacy can assist with legal analysis to gauge
reasonable expectations of privacy).
116. See Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income and Consumption in the
New Economy: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 38 G.A. L. REV. 1, 65 (2003).
117. For discussion, see Joseph Bankman, Eight Truths about Collecting Taxes
from the Cash Economy, 117 TAX NOTES 506, 506-08 (2007).
118. IMF, supra note 73.
119. Id. at 21.
120. Id.
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enforcement reforms alone to change taxpayer compliance conduct in
a significant way.
Nevertheless, in the international sphere, whistleblowing
initiatives appear to offer hope to uncover global financial crimes
such as the UBS bank scandal. There is emerging evidence that
whistleblowing programs can have a material impact on revenue
collection: as a result of the UBS whistleblower, the US government
forced the Swiss government to transfer information concerning over
two thousand anonymous accounts maintained by Americans. In the
United States, whistleblowing rewards have been steadily growing to
roughly $501 million in 2015.121
2. Financial Secrecy Laws and Misaligned Incentives
Countries have historically jealously guarded their rights to
develop tax and financial privacy laws as they wish. 2 2 Accordingly,
tax havens and many other countries passed financial secrecy laws to
anonymize the identity of the ultimate owner of investments (see Part
II.A.2). The end result has been the traditional near anonymity
offered by global capital markets for private financial and, in many
cases, non-financial wealth (e.g., a Manhattan condo). Up to roughly
fifteen years ago an investor who placed his or her money in an
offshore bank account could be reasonably confident that nobody
would learn of its existence. This state of affairs greatly increases
transaction costs facing tax authorities that seek information
regarding offshore transactions.
Tax authorities also face significant bargaining costs if their
audit involves the international criminal aspects of a taxpayer's
activities: investigations and prosecutions can take years to complete
with potentially weak sanctions if the taxpayer is ever convicted. For
this reason, taxpayers engaged in offshore tax evasion are sometimes
offered different forms of relief through voluntary disclosure
programs, including amnesty from criminal prosecutions, should they
disclose their offshore assets and income in a timely fashion.123
The main enforcement challenge is a lack of international
cooperation due to misaligned political incentives.124 Elites within
low and middle income (often nondemocratic) countries use
international financial secrecy as an exit strategy that allows them to
move and hide monies offshore (to preserve their family wealth and
121. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, IRS WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FISCAL
YEAR 2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (2016) (noting that the UBS whistleblower was paid
roughly $100 million in compensation by the IRS).
122. See Arthur Cockfield, Tax Integration Under NAFTA: Resolving the Conflict
Between Economic and Sovereignty Interests, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 57 (1998).
123. See, e.g., CANADA REVENUE AGENCY, INFORMATION CIRCULAR IC00-1R5
(2007).
124. See Big Data, supra note 5, at 535-38.
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security). Tax havens, even if they are forced into binding agreements
such as TJEAs, have incentives to subvert the system (e.g., by
developing new business and legal entities that may fall outside of
current disclosure obligations) and shirk responsibility (e.g., by not
meaningfully enforcing EOI agreements by ensuring they do not
maintain necessary records subject to a transfer request).
Low income countries additionally may not have the human
resources and physical infrastructure to enforce their own domestic
tax laws, let alone engage in effective EOI. 125 Foreign aid and other
resources need to be directed at bolstering the tax administration
efforts for these low income countries. This effort would promote
global financial transparency and reduce transaction costs faced by
the tax authorities in high income countries, as they would be in a
better position to track the cross-border investments of their own
citizens and residents.
A problem is that wealthier OECD countries also benefit from
global financial opacity because they are net recipients of trillions of
dollars in capital flight leaving other countries.126 For instance, the
three largest OECD economies-the United States, Germany, and
Japan-are ranked by Tax Justice Network in the world's top twelve
financial secrecy jurisdictions along with tax havens such as
Switzerland and Luxembourg.127 Even lower-ranked countries such
as Canada maintain laws that enable anonymous investments by
nonresidents.128 These wealthier countries face a moral hazard
because efforts to promote global financial transparency may actually
reduce overall foreign investment within their economies.
As a result of these misaligned incentives, countries cannot
agree, for instance, on a binding supranational agreement that would
abolish all financial secrecy laws. Notably, taxpayer privacy concerns
serve as perhaps the main plausible rationale for refusing to enter
125. See ALEX EASSON AND DAVID HOLLAND, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TAXATION AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: THE
EXPERIENCE OF THE ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION 40 (1995); Timothy Besley & Torsten
Persson, Why Do Developing Countries Tax So Little?, 28 J. EcON. PERSPECTIVES 99,
104 (2014); OHCHR, supra note 4, at 21 (recommending the provision of resources and
technical assistance to support low income countries' tax administrations).
126. The first major tax haven data leak revealed over 20,000 offshore accounts
maintained by Chinese individuals, primarily for purposes of cross-border investments.
Over USD$1 trillion in capital is estimated to have fled China in the last ten years. See
Marina Walker Guevara et al., Leaked Records Reveal Offshore Holdings of China's
Elite, INT'L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Jan. 21, 2013),
https://www.icij.org/offshorelleaked-records-reveal-offshore-holdings-chinas-elite
[https://perma.cc/Q82G-HRBM] (archived Sept. 24, 2017).
127. See supra note 32 and accompanying discussion.
128. See Dave Seglins, 'Tax Haven' Canada Being Used by Offshore Cheats,
Panama Papers Show, CBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2017),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/investigates/panama-papers-canada-tax-haven-1.3950552
[https://perma.cc/9N74-U9WD] (archived Sept. 24, 2017) (discussing how federal and
provincial corporate laws permit anonymous foreign investments).
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into such an agreement, highlighting the need to protect privacy
interests to encourage enforcement (see Part III.B).
D. Summary
Many governments now have over two decades' worth of
experience with automatic tax information exchange. Most recently,
governments have signed onto the CRS to promote automatic bulk
exchanges. While automatic bulk EOI is a worthy goal, improving the
quality of the exchanged information is the next area of obvious focus.
Data availability, usefulness, and verifiability are three
components of high quality information that can help governments
pursue their cross-border investigations and audits. In particular,
transferred information should be relatable to domestic tax
identification measures and checked against third party reporting
and withholding tax disclosures. Once this is done, governments can
conduct analysis to determine audit risk by focusing on issues such as
taxpayer segmentation, dealings between the taxpayer and offshore
service providers, and cross-indexing of tax and financial information
against non-tax data (e.g., insurance policy disclosures).
Against this desire for high quality tax information stands
taxpayer privacy concerns. The apprehensions arise from the varied
levels of domestic legal protection afforded to privacy rights, along
with the risk of abuse or misuse of transferred information.
Accordingly, broader multilateral agreement on privacy protections is
likely a prerequisite to effective EOI. This hoped-for cooperation is
hindered by the fact that many countries refuse to abolish their
financial secrecy laws, which stands as one of the main barriers to
optimal reform.
IV. ADDRESSING KEY CHALLENGES THROUGH DATA ANALYTICS
As a result of ongoing reforms, governments are increasingly
amassing "bulk" taxpayer information provided by other
governments. As discussed above, however, more information is not
necessarily better (see Part III.A). As explored below, the collection of
big data and use of big data analytics enhances information quality
and has the potential to reduce transaction costs by better identifying
risks for audit and enforcement purposes.
Prior to proceeding with the analysis, it might be helpful to offer
definitions of big data and data analytics. Big data normally connotes
the following three factors: (a) the data set is large and diverse; (b)
the information is being generated on an ongoing basis (versus a
static data set); and (c) the data is normally capable of being
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subjected to data analytics.129 The factors are sometimes referred to
as the three "Vs": volume, variety, and velocity.130
Data analytics in turn is the computer analysis of big data to
reveal patterns or other information that is useful to governments,
businesses, or other analysts. The basic idea is that, while different
data points from different sources may appear unrelated, data
analytics can potentially provide insights by combining all of the data
points to reveal new information and connections that had been
previously undetected. The subsequent discussion focuses on how
EOI initiatives should account for the possible application of data
analytics.131
A. Information Quality and Risk Analysis
Tax authorities are increasingly deploying data analytics to help
fight tax fraud and evasion.132 For example, US state governments,
including those of Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, and New York, have
used data analytics to identify tax schemes used to trigger fraudulent
refunds. Under this approach, the taxpayer's tax refund request is
cross-referenced against billions of records from public and
commercial databases to catch the cheaters. New York's Department
of Taxation and Finance, for instance, decreased revenue losses by
$1.2 billion in 2010 through the use of data analytics.'3 3
The application of data analytics to transferred tax information
as well as domestic sources of tax and non-tax data can also assist in
flagging the risk of offshore tax evasion and noncompliant
129. The definition of the term "big data" remains unsettled within social
science perspectives in part because of the relative newness of the concept. For
discussion of big data and regulations, see VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH
CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND
THINK 73-78 (2013).
130. See Michael Alles and Glen Gray, A Framework for Analyzing the Potential
Role of Big Data in Auditing: A Synthesis of the Literature 9 (Sept. 14, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
131. For discussion of US tax authorities' reforms to expand financial
information sharing to combat non-compliance and evasion, see Andrew T. Buckler,
Information Technology in the U.S. Tax Administration, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND
TAXATION 159, 171-75 (Robert F. van Brederode ed., 2012) (describing how new
analytical tools and processes allow for the identification and analysis of large amounts
of unstructured data).
132. Accounting firms have already devised sophisticated software programs to
manage and exploit 'big data' for tax compliance, planning and other purposes. See,
e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, Diagnostic Tools and Data Analytics,
http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Tax/VAT--GST-and-other-sales-taxes/EY-managing-
indirect-tax-data-in-the-digital-age-2-diagnostic-tools-and-data-analytics
[https://perma.ccl7JHL-A65N] (archived Sept. 24, 2017).
133. JoAnne Bourquard & Cassandra Kirsch, Big Data = Big Benefits, STATE
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international tax planning. Big data thus far has not been used
extensively for international tax purposes, although there has been
analysis concerning the amount of bulk taxpayer information shared
between governments.13 4 Governments exchange bulk taxpayer
information mainly to ensure that resident taxpayers are reporting
their global income for tax purposes.3 5
1. Sources of EOI
As discussed previously, high quality information is promoted by
using available sources of data, cross-indexing it against other
sources, and ensuring the data is verifiable. If possible, high quality
information should include "big tax data" in that it has sufficient
volume, variety, and velocity so that can it be used with data
analytics to help with audits and investigations.136
With respect to evasion, governments can amass and cross-index
domestic and cross-border tax information and non-tax information
concerning:13 7 (a) automatic tax and financial information provided in
bulk by other governments; (b) common taxpayer identification
numbers or ones that are relatable to domestic tax identification
numbers; (c) reports of cross-border financial flows provided by
financial intelligence units (e.g., the Treasury Department's Financial
Crime Enforcement Network (FinCEN)), including suspicious activity
reports and suspicious transaction reports; (d) resident taxpayers' tax
returns, including non-disclosures of offshore assets or income; (e)
disclosures of taxpayers' dealings with offshore service providers and
related financial dealings; and (f) resident taxpayers' domestic
consumption patterns (e.g., purchase of Italian sports cars).
As a result of privacy concerns, perhaps the most controversial
data source is the final one: non-tax data. At times, countries pass
laws to restrict government transfers among different agencies or
impose restrictions on the collection of potentially unrelated personal
information.13 8 Such sharing generally violates fair information
134. See Keen & Ligthart, supra note 9 (noting, among other things, how the
gross amount of tax information shared between the Netherlands and certain other
countries grew on average by 43 percent a year from 1993 to 2001).
135. See Dean, supra note 11, at 637-46 (discussing policy reasons that lead to
the greater usage of cross-border tax information).
136. See Brigitte Unger & Frans van Waarden, How to Dodge Drowning in
Data? Rule- and Risk-Based Anti-Money Laundering Policies Compared, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON MONEY LAUNDERING 399, 399-425 (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of using risk-based approaches versus rule-based approaches).
137. See Big Data, supra note 5, at 500-502.
138. Under fair information practices, the 'limiting collection' criterion means
that personal information should only be used for reasons that were specified at the
time of collection hence personal information in say an insurance policy can normally
only be used for insurance purposes. The limiting collection criterion hence restricts
the ability of a government to transfer personal information to another government
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practices (FIPs), touched on earlier in Part III.B.2, because the
information is used for a different purpose from the one intended
when it was initially collected (e.g., the Federal Trade Commission
guidelines that, in some circumstances, limit the personal
information collection, use, and disclosure policies of federal
government agencies).13 9
For an example of a current administrative practice, the
Australian Taxation Office cross-indexes insurance policy records and
asset value reports against taxpayers' disclosed sources of income.14 0
If a taxpayer discloses, say, a multi-million dollar work of art in an
insurance policy while disclosing very little income, then data
analysis could trigger an investigation or audit. Governments can
also transfer non-tax data as long as their tax treaties provide for
such transfers: in 2005, the OECD model tax treaty was amended to
enable the transfer of such non-tax data for tax and other purposes
(e.g., pursuing global terrorist financiers).141
With respect to tax avoidance, governments could collect and run
matches against: (a) information on tax filings in foreign countries
(perhaps collected under the proposed common template under
CBCR);142 (b) information on "boilerplate' cross-border tax structures
that are marketed to multiple clients to reduce global tax
liabilities; 143 (c) information on transfer prices charged by taxpayers
in related industries;144 and (d) non-tax data revealed by public
company filings (e.g., number of employees in each country) or via the
CBCR template (see Part II.B).
agency when the information was initially collected for a specific purpose. See supra
text accompanying notes 108-09.
139. FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN
THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE 18 (2000).
140. See AUSTL. TAXATION OFFICE, Lifestyle Assets 2013-14 and 2014-15
Financial Years Data Matching Program Protocols,
https://www.ato.gov.aulgeneral/gen/lifestyle-assets-data-matching-program-protocol/
[https://perma.cc/55W5-QAAW] (archived Sept. 22, 2017) (last modified Feb. 15, 2016).
141. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL
art. 26.
142. See supra text accompanying note 65.
143. The proposed system would provide national tax authorities with more
information concerning cross-border tax planning structures that do not comply with
tax law. At times, aggressive tax planning has resulted in serious sanctions against
industry players who promoted the planning. For discussion, see U.S. S. PERMANENT
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVT AFFAIRS, REP. ON
THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONAL FIRMS IN THE U.S. TAx SHELTER INDUSTRY, S. REP. No.
109-54 (2005) (discussing fines assessed against KPMG for improper tax shelters).
144. See generally Cockfield, supra note 77 (discussing how online technologies
and an intranet accessible by tax authorities can facilitate EOI, including exchanges of
bulk transfer pricing information).
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2. Sources and Data Analytics
Once the data has been collected, governments can design
software programs to try to identify correlations that point to specific
risk factors.
Compared with governments, accounting firms and other
members of the private sector have more aggressively embraced data
analytics for compliance, audit, and other tax purposes. Data
analytics is being used to automate multi-jurisdictional tax
compliance, reduce tax errors, find tax savings opportunities, and
reduce administrative costs.145 Initial efforts are also being directed
at generating tax law advice by sifting through large data sets of case
law, legislation, and administrative practices.146 By identifying
helpful or problematic aspects of particular cases, data analytics
hence will one day potentially inform a government prosecutor's
decision on whether to prosecute offshore tax evasion.
Private sector auditors are also using data analytics to improve
audit quality and detect fraud. As discussed by Christine Early, this
development has occurred in part because the population of the tested
transactions has also increased.14 7 Like tax authorities, auditors
previously used risk-based models that focused on sample
transactions to determine if a taxpayer is accurately stating his or
her account balances. In contrast, all of a firm's transactions (that is,
100 percent of the tested population) can be tested using data
analytics. The hope is that each year's data analytics-assisted audit
will identify problem areas as well as vulnerabilities then learn from
experience to better target subsequent fraud as well as unintentional
errors to reduce false positives.148
Governments could move in this direction by requesting all
transaction details instead of a summary of this information for tax
return purposes.149 In theory, the government can collect and store
this vast amount of tax and financial information in the cloud with its
seemingly near-limitless storage ability.
145. See Christine E. Earley, Data Analytics in Auditing: Opportunities and
Challenges, 58 Bus. HORIZONS 493, 495 (2015).
146. See generally Benjamin Alarie, Anthony Niblett & Albert Yoon, Using
Machine Learning to Predict Outcomes in Tax Law (Working Paper, Oct. 16, 2016),
https://ssrn.comlabstract=2855977 [https://perma.cc/9QZ6-ZSHT] (archived Sept. 22,
2017).
147. Earley, supra note 145, at 495-496.
148. Id.
149. For a review of the ways that technology affects tax administration and
design in developing countries, see Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Technology and
Taxation in Developing Countries, in 40 SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND TAXATION 121,
130-133 (Robert F. van Brederode et al. eds., 2012) (discussing the importance of
technologies to track the identities of taxpayers and provide accurate information
reporting to tax authorities).
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Note that as governments deploy data analytics to determine
risks, taxpayers will presumably try to reverse engineer these moves
through their own data analytics. They will do this to proactively
manage their tax filings to reduce the risk of audit.
3. Data Analytics with Integrated Risk Analysis
Finally, the propqsed data analytics systems can also be linked
to existing "integrated risk analysis" that tries to correlate different
taxpayer risk factors such as use of home offices. Under the
Compliance Risk Management (CRM) approach, initially designed by
the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), tax authorities first seek to
measure and understand the causes of compliance gaps and then to
allocate resources to different taxpayer segments.15 0
According to the ATO, the next step is to deliver mitigating and
tailored responses to different compliance gap issues, emphasizing
ways to facilitate compliance and/or deter further unwanted
activities.151 The tax authorities can then target for audit or
investigation the taxpayers identified as having a higher risk of tax
evasion as well as avoidance schemes that do not comply with tax
laws. Finally, under CRM, governments should measure the impact
of any actions taken.
B. A Global Government Financial Registry
1. The Proposals: Public versus Government Access
In recent years, there have been calls for the creation of a global
financial registry, searchable by the public and/or governments, of
business entities (e.g., corporations and limited liability companies)
and legal entities (e.g., trusts and foundations).5 2 In addition, some
proposals would seek to list within this public or government registry
the names of the ultimate or beneficial owners of the business and
legal entities.
A fully searchable public financial registry would be highly
problematic as it would overly intrude on taxpayer privacy rights and
potentially inhibit global capital flows, reducing overall economic
growth. As mentioned in Part III.B, taxpayer privacy is an interest
protected by domestic, constitutional, and international law.
150. IMF, supra note 73, at 42-43.
151. Id. at 43.
152. For discussion, see, for example, Gabriel Zucman, Taxing Across Borders:
Tracking Personal Wealth and Corporate Profits, 28 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 121 (2014)
(advocating a world financial registry to respond to ongoing increases in offshore tax
evasion and aggressive international tax avoidance).
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Moreover, the broader category of privacy is recognized by the United
Nations and many countries as a fundamental human right.
There are also efficiency worries related to a possible database
that could be searchable by members of the public. Efficient private
bargaining in many circumstances is promoted by anonymizing
commercial and individual identities. Business people may prefer to
conduct their transactions in private to avoid giving up competitive
advantages, trade secrets, and commercially confidential
information.153 Finally, the reform could backfire if other business
people "reverse engineered" the public information about offshore
investments to engage in even more aggressive revenue-depleting tax
planning.154
Moreover, the international cooperation needed for a registry
might be difficult or impossible to generate: many governments have
passed privacy and other laws that prohibit the publication of
government information such as tax and financial information or, in
many cases, the transfer of such information to foreign
governments.s5 5 As discussed, certain countries or subnational
jurisdictions additionally continue to offer financial secrecy (e.g., via
Delaware LLCs) and would view a public registry of tax and financial
records as an unacceptable intrusion into their fiscal and political
sovereignty (see Part III.C).
2. Promoting Information Quality via a Government Registry
Nevertheless, a global financial registry accessible only by
government tax authorities might be politically feasible. Such a
registry would lower transaction costs facing government
153. For discussion see, for example, GILLIAN K. HADFIELD, The Many Legal
Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments, in HANDBOOK OF NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONoics 175, 181 (Claude M6nard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005).
154. Joshua D. Blank, Reconsidering Corporate Tax Privacy, 11 N.Y.U. J. L. &
BUS. 31, 37 (2014).
155. Governments have 'signalled' that taxpayer privacy is important in part to
encourage long-term investment, and reneging on this commitment may hence reduce
this investment. See Brian Levy & Pablo T. Spiller, The Institutional Foundations of
Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation,
10 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 201 (1994) (noting the importance of stability with respect to
government signalling concerning expropriation of property and other matters). For
discussion of addressing international tax challenges via OECD cooperative processes,
see generally Hugh J. Ault, Reflections on the Role of the OECD in Developing
International Tax Norms, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 757 (2009) (discussing how OECD
reforms influence the development of international tax norms); Arthur J. Cockfield,
The Rise of the OECD as Informal World Tax Organization Through the Shaping of
National Responses to E-Commerce Tax Challenges, 8 YALE J. L. & TECH 136 (2006)
(claiming the OECD's institutional setting encourages cooperation); Diane Ring, Who is
Making International Tax Policy: International Organizations as Power Players in a
High Stakes World, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. (2010) (reviewing how OECD institutions
seek to attract consensus).
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investigators by addressing one of the main information
disadvantages facing governments, namely their inability to identify
the human beneficial owners of cross-border investments (see Parts
II.A and III.C). In addition, the registry would help governments
determine if their resident firms had paid tax on worldwide income
(as most so-called territorial tax systems tax the foreign source
passive income of resident taxpayers with a few exceptions to this
rule, such as Hong Kong, which does not seek to tax such income).156
Through the use of data analytics, governments could combine the
information within the registry with other tax and financial data to,
as discussed above, help identify and address risks.
Governments might consider relaxing their financial secrecy
laws to allow for the government-to-government exchange of entity
and ownership information if they were provided with sufficient
privacy safeguards (see Part III.B). 1 5 7 Still, noncooperative states
would presumably develop new business or legal entities that would
not be covered by the new disclosure obligations. In addition, the
entity and ownership information is often recorded by offshore service
providers and tax haven governments do not currently have access to
this information.158 Nor do many low income countries have the
needed human and information technologies resources for effective
collection, use, and disclosure within an EOI regime (see Parts III.A
and III.C).
C. Deputizing Private Sector Actors
A final tentative idea is for government law and policy to support
deputizing members of the private sector to apply data analytics to
publicly available tax and non-tax information to fight noncompliant
aggressive international tax planning.59
As discussed in Part II.A, tax authorities often find it difficult to
police transfer pricing because taxpayers enjoy an information
advantage over tax authorities (in that taxpayers better understand
the application of tax rules to their unique cross-border investments
and transactions). Large taxpayers often deploy significant resources
to design, implement, and, if needed, defend international tax
156. Under the US approach, which is consistent with the rules in place in many
countries, tax laws ensure that any "passive" foreign source income (e.g., interest or
royalties) is taxed on an accrual basis. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 951-965 (2007) (Subpart F).
157. Zucman, supra note 152, at 145 (noting that many countries already
maintain central securities depositories that track ownership of equity and debt
instruments).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 83-86.
159. This idea is a result of a conversation between the author and Murray
Rankin, NDP Minister of Parliament for Victoria, British Columbia and former
member of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance (House of Commons,
Canada).
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avoidance strategies. In contrast, many tax authorities are struggling
to keep up with these developments.
Even tax authorities that have traditionally led technology
developments can face an uphill battle. According to a recent account,
"as a result of its own poor performance and lean budgets, the IRS is
forced to rely on aging, outmoded IT systems that sometimes do not
interface with each other."1 60 For low and middle income countries,
the situation is much direr, as writings suggest that many such
countries already struggle to collect needed information to enforce
existing domestic tax laws as well as to fulfill treaty obligations (see
Part III.C).
To the extent that reforms one day generate publicly available
tax information (beyond current public company financial disclosures
mandated by securities laws), private sector taxpayers could harness
this information to design and implement data analytics applications
to inform government investigations and audits.
In essence, governments could "deputize" individuals and private
sector businesses to help identify untaxed income.16 1 Assuming
CBCR-mandated information one day becomes available to the public,
private sector actors could conduct data analysis on issues such as
profits per employees in different jurisdictions, how transfer prices
vary from existing comparables in similar industries, and whether
intangible assets are being shifted to low or nil tax jurisdictions
without paying compensatory royalties to the country of initial
development. The analysis could then be sent to the government, and
the deputized firm would be offered some financial reward such as a
percentage of any additional taxes recovered.
D. Summary
Data analytics can take high quality information and make it
even more useful by generating insights through the computer
analysis of seemingly disparate and disconnected data. In particular,
by subjecting mass tax and non-tax data to data analytics, previously
obscure relationships can reveal anomalies and expose ways to better
target tax audits and investigations. EOI reforms should account for
the possibility of data analytics and be designed to generate tax and
financial information with sufficient volume, variety, and velocity so
that it can be used with such analysis. Information within a global
financial registry could also be subjected to data analytics.
160. Johnson, supra note 105, at 17.
161. But see Bankman, supra note 117, at 8 (rejecting deputizing taxpayers to go
after tax cheats as "unseemly"). It bears mentioning that common law countries like
the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States (under state but not federal law)
have traditions where 'private prosecutors' (private sector lawyers) are hired to
prosecute criminal offences in different circumstances.
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Governments could also consider deputizing private sector firms to
conduct data analytics of publicly available information to help
identify untaxed income.
V. CONCLUSION
A lack of global financial transparency permits corrupt elites and
others to drain their countries of financial resources and then hide
these monies offshore. In some cases, such as the South Sudanese
example in the Introduction, much of the remaining population
suffers from starvation and other human rights violations. In other
situations, developing countries provide multinational firms with tax
breaks that allow these firms to exploit resources and reap significant
profits-while paying little to no tax. In addition, complex cross-
border tax planning structures can subvert the intent of tax laws by
lowering global financial tax liabilities for wealthy taxpayers and
multinational firms. All of these forms of under-payment or non-
payment of taxes to governments deprive the state of monies needed
to deliver on its human rights obligations through the provision of
public goods and services, from a functioning judiciary to health care,
education, environmental regulation, housing, and adequate
standards of living.
To fight against offshore tax evasion and aggressive
international tax avoidance, governments increasingly turn to cross-
border exchanges of (tax) information (EOI). More and better
information could promote global financial transparency and address
information asymmetry problems that raise transaction costs and
bedevil enforcement efforts. The last ten years have witnessed a
number of related reforms, including a US unilateral effort known as
the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) and OECD
initiatives to promote bilateral tax information exchange agreements
and multilateral agreements regarding the Common Reporting
Standard (CRS) and Country by Country Reporting (CBCR).
As countries build on these initiatives and deploy new ones, they
are increasingly studying optimal EOI laws and policies. While
ongoing reforms emphasize exchanges of "bulk" or mass taxpayer
data, less attention has been paid to promoting high quality tax
information exchanges to support government audits and
investigations. High quality information is information that: (a) can
be accessed and cross-indexed by governments against other
information sources; (b) is useful for tax administration purposes; and
(c) is verifiable to ensure data integrity. The exchange and usage of
high quality tax information would reduce transaction costs for tax
authorities as they could more readily identify taxpayers engaged in
offshore tax evasion and aggressive international.tax planning.
Yet there are ongoing barriers that inhibit the exchange of high
quality tax information. Taxpayer privacy remains a concern, given
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the varied national and international rules that protect taxpayer
privacy interests, along with disagreement on appropriate
safeguards. Tax havens and other countries sometimes maintain
financial secrecy laws that make it difficult or impossible to
determine the ultimate owner of cross-border investments. Moreover,
many low income countries lack the human and physical resources to
engage in automatic EOI, let alone ensure the transferred
information is of high quality.
Nevertheless, countries with sufficient administrative resources
can promote enforcement through the greater adoption of data
analytics and its application to transferred "big tax data." Data
analytics can potentially help tax authorities identify risks of
noncompliant taxpayer behavior by identifying relationships that
would otherwise be obscured. In addition, data analytics applied to
the tax and financial information within a possible global financial
registry could help governments investigate and audit taxpayers. A
final tentative idea is to "deputize" private sector actors to sift
through big tax data and other sources to identify untaxed income
and assist tax authorities in their effort to collect more revenues.
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